We formally prove end-to-end correctness of a ground robot implemented in a simulator. We use an untrusted controller supervised by a verified sandbox. Contributions include: i) A model of the robot in differential dynamic logic, which specifies assumptions on the controller and robot kinematics, ii) Formal proofs of safety and liveness for a waypoint-following problem with speed limits, iii) An automatically synthesized sandbox, which is automatically proven to enforce model compliance at runtime, and iv) Controllers, planners, and environments for the simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many autonomous ground robots, including self-driving cars, are safety-critical because they operate near or in concert with humans. Formally verifying these systems is important: verification both provides the strongest certification of correctness and also elucidates key controllability conditions and system invariants that can be employed in design and implementation. Yet, formal verification faces well-known challenges of its own: Verification of a formal model only ensures real-world correctness insofar as the model accurately captures reality (the model gap) and only insofar as the property verified is a useful notion of correctness.
Closing this gap is an enduring challenge because every stage of development is interconnected: Oversimplifications in a model might become evident only after testing, while conversely it is hard to assess whether low-level designs are faithful to the model. This challenge is especially great in today's software ecosystem, where robots might be controlled This research is supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and by AFOSR FA9550-16-1-0288. This material is based upon work supported by the United States Air Force and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under Contract No. FA8750-18-C-0092. The first author was also supported by the Department of Defense through the National Defense Science & Engineering Graduate Fellowship Program. The second author was also supported by A*STAR, Singapore. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of any sponsoring institution, the U.S. government or any other entity. by anything from classical PD (proportional + derivative) controllers to machine-learned controllers. For this reason, we advocate the use of formally verified sandboxes as the crucial link between the formal and the informal:
• We model a 2D ground robot as a hybrid program [19] , with waypoint-following and error tolerance. • We prove safety and liveness for the model with the KeYmaera X theorem prover [12] for differential dynamic logic (dL) [19] . • We use the VeriPhy toolchain [4] to synthesize a sandbox and to automatically prove its correctness down to the machine code implementation. This yields our claimed end-to-end correctness proof for the ground robot. We evaluate the performance of the verified sandbox by applying it to a range of unverified controllers in software simulation. These include classical bang-bang and PD feedback controllers with a variety of settings. A key benefit of the blackbox approach is that we need not verify the individual low-level controllers: they retain the aforementioned safety guarantees because the verified sandbox guards against any (potentially) dangerous control decisions.
Our evaluation shows that: i) the implementations never leave the prescribed safe regions around their requested paths, ii) the model assumptions hold in practice, and iii) there is a trade-off between meeting model assumptions and operational performance: the more aggressive a controller is, the more often it breaks assumptions.
We demonstrate VeriPhy as a particularly useful tool for end-to-end development of verified systems: The model, its proof, and its implementation inform one another, a process aided by the automation and rigor provided by VeriPhy. For example: i) the proof process reveals invariants and controllability constraints which guide the implementation, ii) if the implementation violates the safety monitor, the monitor failure informs revisions to the model and implementation, and iii) this process continues until the developers are satisfied with the performance of the implementation under the safety monitors of the sandbox.
The paper serves also as a case study on safety and liveness verification in dL: once the safety property is proved, much of the effort can be reused to simplify the liveness proof.
II. RELATED WORK
Related work in formal methods and robotics has applied synthesis and verification to safe control of robotic systems.
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The present work is unique among these in its use of a verifiedsafe sandbox controller to enforce compliance between the implementation and formal model for a realistic robot simulation with an expressive correctness guarantee.
A. Synthesis for Planning and Control
A significant focus of related work is the synthesis of motion plans from high-level specifications. These works can be fruitfully combined with ours, providing a high-level plan to be followed, but none of them address correctness of lowlevel controllers that implement the plan, and all trust the correctness of their kinematic models:
• The tools LTLMoP [8] and TuLiP [7] can synthesize robot controls that satisfy a high-level temporal logic specification. However, they depend on accuracy of their kinematic models, which assume discrete-space and discrete-time, and the guarantees are not end-to-end. • Bisimulation [2] is used to synthesize plans based on hybrid dynamics [3, 6] , but assumes model compliance and cannot ensure low-level controller correctness. • Controllers have been synthesized: i) from temporal logic specifications for linear systems [13] , ii) for adaptive cruise control [18] , tested in simulation and on hardware, and iii) from safety proofs [23] for switched systems using templates, but those works assume model compliance and cannot ensure low-level controller correctness.
B. Offline Verification for Planning and Control
In contrast to online synthesis of a correct plan and/or controller, offline verification shows correctness before the fact, which is often more tractable and eases incorporation of custom controllers. Much of the verification in robotics focuses on hybrid systems models; common approaches are reachability analysis [11] and theorem proving [12] .
• 1D straight-line motion was addressed both in dL (for direct velocity control) [4] and with reachability analysis [5] , but the 2D motion demanded by real robots introduces novel modeling, verification, and implementation challenges: our invariants and controllers must account for curved motion, acceleration, and uncertain sensing and actuation. • Unbounded-time 2D obstacle avoidance and 1D liveness have also been proved in dL [16, 17] . A paper proof of liveness using dL rules assumed perfect sensing and constant speed [15] . Their controllers, like ours, are closely related to the classic Dynamic-Window [9] control algorithm. In contrast to the prior dL effort, we offer stronger results, including 2D liveness, waypointfollowing, and end-to-end correctness. • A planner for ground vehicles was verified [20] in Isabelle/HOL. Unlike our work, it does not address lowlevel control and implementation correctness.
C. Online Verification
In contrast to offline verification, online (or runtime) verification uses runtime checks to enforce safe operation.
• The basis of online verification is the SIMPLEX [14] method, which uses a trusted monitor to decide between an untrusted controller and trusted fallback. • The VeriPhy [4] toolchain for dL, which we use, extends SIMPLEX by ensuring the monitor is correct-byconstruction, formally proving the safety of the resulting system, and automatically maintaining safety down to machine code implementation. High-Assurance SPI-RAL [10] is another implementation toolchain for dL, but does not provide formal end-to-end guarantees, and neither has been used to develop an end-to-end system capable of free-range 2D driving until now. • Runtime reachability analysis has been used for car control [1] , but relies on correctness of the model and of the analysis implementation. Since reachability tools rely on large, complicated codebases and models are challenging to get right, these assumptions present a correctness gap which stands in the way of an end-to-end argument.
D. Simulation
Simulation is an essential part of evaluating models and designs for any robotic system. Multiple simulation platforms are available, of which AirSim [21] is a recent platform for UAVs and autonomous cars. Other simulators would likely have worked as well, but we chose AirSim because it is configured with high-fidelity physical and visual models out of the box, reducing the chances of introducing modeling errors.
In short, while verification of robotics is well-studied, few works have addressed end-to-end guarantees with the highest level of rigor, and in this paper we develop the first realistic, end-to-end system with an expressive correctness guarantee of safety and liveness for 2D waypoint following.
III. BACKGROUND: DIFFERENTIAL DYNAMIC LOGIC
We write our model as a hybrid program and use differential dynamic logic (dL) [19] to verify it. Hybrid programs are a programming language for expressing hybrid systems combining discrete computation with continuous physics. They are particularly useful for verified robotics because they concisely describe both the control laws and kinematics of the system. The syntax of hybrid programs is given in Table I : Hybrid programs combine discrete computation (assignment x := θ, nondeterministic assignments x := * , and tests ?φ) and continuous change x = θ & ψ with combinators: choices (α ∪β) list control choices without specifying exactly when each choice is taken, sequential composition (α; β) composes programs one after another, and looping (α * ) models long-running systems.
We will give a flexible 2D model in Sect. IV. First, in Example 1, we recall a toy example, α SV , of 1D motion with perfect speed control from [4] . This is an example of a controlplant loop α SV ≡ (ctrl SV ; plant SV ) * , with a discrete ctrl SV program followed by a continuous plant SV modeling physics repeated in a loop. The controller can either go forward (0≤v≤V ) if we are far enough (d ≥ T V ) from the destination d, else it must stop by setting velocity v to 0. The differential equation d = −v, t = 1 says the distance d continuously decreases proportional to velocity v, while time continuously elapses at a constant rate. The constraint t ≤ T is a time trigger, saying that up to T time units may elapse between control cycles. Note that we will show safety for any number of control cycles, and thus for unbounded time.
Example 1 (1D Idealized Driving).
Formulas of dL are used to formalize program properties:
Definition 1 (dL formulas). Formulas φ, ψ of dL consist of the following operators:
and ∃x φ are per classical first-order logic. Formula θ 1 ∼ θ 2 is shorthand for any comparison operator ∼ ∈{≤, <, =, =, >, ≥} where θ i are (polynomial) real-valued terms. The modalities [α]φ and α φ say φ holds in all or some state reached by executing hybrid program α respectively; they are used to express safety and liveness properties for our models.
Eq. 1 is a safety specification for α SV : If the robot has not yet collided (d ≥ 0) then the verified model will never collide no matter how many further control cycles are executed:
This toy example, which was previously used to demonstrate VeriPhy [4] , misses out on many of the challenges essential to robotics: curved motion and acceleration demand more sophisticated control conditions and invariants, which themselves demand more sophisticated proof techniques. We take on these challenges in Sect. IV.
IV. GROUND ROBOT MODEL
This section introduces our 2D robot model in dL. This model is the heart of our verification effort: it lays out the definition of safety, assumptions on the controller, and assumptions on the plant. It will enable us in Sect. V to prove that these assumptions are strong enough to guarantee safety, then in Sect. VI to synthesize a sandbox which is guaranteed to safely enforce the assumptions at runtime. While the additional liveness proof of Sect. V is not strictly necessary for runtime safety, liveness is itself an essential correctness property, and proving it thus greatly increases our confidence in the model.
The demands of runtime monitoring also inform the model design, in turn. We prove safety of waypoint-following because it can be used to express a wide variety of realistic scenarios, compared to other safety specifications such as obstacle avoidance [16] . At the implementation level, these waypoints are fed as input from a high-level planner: low-level control is considered correct so long as it follows the waypoints within a desired tolerance. Our model incorporates these tolerances in order to support, for example, the imperfect measurements provided by real sensors.
Each waypoint is specified by coordinates (x, y), a curvature k, and a speed limit [vl, vh] which the robot's velocity v must always obey when at the waypoint. The curvature parameter yields circular arcs (when k = 0) and lines (when k = 0) as primitives. The addition of speed limits allows a planner to specify, for example, that the robot ought to slow down for a sharp curve or stop. Because realistic robots never follow a path perfectly, we will bloat each arc to an annulus section which is more easily followed. Our hybrid program α is again a time-triggered control-plant loop: α ≡ (ctrl; plant) * .
We use relative coordinates: the robot's position is always the origin, from which perspective the waypoint "moves toward" the vehicle. This simplifies proofs (fewer variables) and implementation (real sensors and actuators are vehiclecentric). The plant is an ODE describing the robot kinematics:
Here, a is an input from the controller describing the acceleration with which the robot is to follow the arc of curvature k to waypoint (x, y). In the equations for x , y : i) The v factor models (x, y) moving at linear velocity v, ii) The k, x, y factors model circular motion with curvature k, with k > 0 corresponding to counter-clockwise rotation, k < 0 to clockwise rotation, and k = 0 to straight-line motion, iii) The additional −1 term in the y equation shifts the center of rotation to 1 k , 0 . The equations v = a and t = 1 make acceleration the derivative of velocity and t stand for current time. The domain constraint t ≤ T ∧ v ≥ 0 says that the duration of one control cycle shall never exceed a timestep parameter T > 0 representing the maximum delay between control cycles and that the robot never drives in reverse. Fig. 4 illustrates control scenarios for the system in relative coordinates. The control choice k = 0 drives waypoints that are straight ahead of the robot straight towards the robot. For waypoints initially to the right of the robot, a control choice k > 0 yields counter-clockwise motion of the waypoint towards the robot. Conversely, for waypoints initially to the left, the control choice with k < 0 yields clockwise motion. 4 depicts exact curves of curvature k which exactly intersect the origin. Because real robots cannot follow these curves exactly, we bloat the waypoint by a fixed ball of radius ε > 0, giving the robot some freedom in curve-following. We refer to this bloated waypoint as the goal for the robot. Fig. 2 illustrates an example goal of size ε = 1 around the origin and several trajectories which pass through the goal. k > 0 The controller's task is to compute the desired acceleration a such that the speed limit v ∈ [vl, vh] can be ensured by the time the robot reaches the goal. Notably, this means an aggressive controller is free to exceed vh temporarily as long as there is time to slow down until v ≤ vh again before reaching the goal. The controller is written: where the high-level planner assignment (x, y) := * chooses the next 2D waypoint, the assignment [vl, vh] := * chooses the speed limit interval, and k := * chooses any curvature. The feasibility test ?Feas determines whether or not the chosen waypoint, speed limit, and curvature are physically attainable in the current state under the plant dynamics (e.g., it checks that there is enough remaining distance to get within the speed limit interval). As a simplifying assumption, we restrict the planner to only choose waypoints with y > 0, i.e., waypoints lie in the upper half-plane or "in front" of the robot. This simplifies the low-level controller, and correspondingly, our proofs. We show in Sect. VI this requirement is easily satisfied by the implementation. Intuitively, if the planner requires driving to a waypoint that is "behind" the robot, it can still do so via an additional intermediate waypoint.
The low-level controller chooses acceleration a := * and the admissibility test ?Go checks that the chosen a will take the robot to its goal with a safe speed limit, subject to a falling in a range of allowable accelerations: [−B, A]. The abbreviation ctrl a names just the control code responsible for deciding how the waypoint is followed rather than which waypoint is followed. We will discuss the crucial feasibility and admissibility conditions in Sect. V-A. The result is a flexible model of the robot, for which we verify safety and liveness in Sect. V.
V. FORMAL SAFETY AND LIVENESS GUARANTEES
We now state the safety and liveness theorems we proved in dL (we say a formula is valid if it is true in every state):
Theorem 1 (Safety). The following dL formula is valid:
The first four assumptions (A>0 ∧ · · · ∧ ε>0) are basic sign conditions on the symbolic constants used in the model. The final assumption, J, is the loop invariant, which characterizes the maximally permissive initial states for which the safety and liveness properties follow in our proofs. The full definition of J is deferred to Sect. V-A. We write (x, y) for the Euclidean norm x 2 + y 2 and consider the robot "close enough" to the waypoint when (x, y) ≤ ε for our chosen goal size ε. The theorem states that no matter which (admissible) control decisions are made, whenever the vehicle is in the goal region of size ε, it obeys the speed limit v ∈ [vl, vh]. While this captures the desired notion of safety, it does not prove that the robot can actually reach the goal, which is a liveness property:
Theorem 2 (Liveness). The following dL formula is valid:
This theorem has the same assumptions as Theorem 1. It says that no matter how long the robot has been running ([(ctrl; plant) * ]), then if some simplifying assumptions still hold (v>0 ∧ y>0) the controller can be continually run ( (ctrl a ; plant) * ) with admissible acceleration choices (ctrl a )
to reach the present goal ( (x, y) ≤ ε) within the desired speed limits (v ∈ [vl, vh]). The simplifying assumptions v>0 ∧ y>0 say the robot is still moving forward and the waypoint is still in the upper half-plane, i.e., we have already run past the waypoint.
A. Proving Safety
We describe the safety proof at a high level here; the full KeYmaera X proof is given in the supplementary materials. Safety proofs in dL are based on invariant reasoning: we first prove that the hybrid program remains within some region J, then prove that J contains only states that meet our definition of safety. One main benefit of using formal verification in dL is that finding an invariant region J and designing a controller to keep the system inside J are interwoven, both checked with proofs: In order to satisfy the safety condition, intuitively, our hybrid program must maintain as an invariant J: i) that the robot follows the planned arc closely and ii) that it drives at speeds that still let it achieve the speed limits in the remaining distance to the goal. Fig. 3 illustrates a key part of the invariant region J of the system: we ensure that the system never leaves an annulus section ending at the waypoint (x, y) with the specified curvature k. The width ε of the annulus is a system parameter specifying how closely we intend to follow the arc. A larger choice of ε yields more error tolerance in the sensed position and followed curvature at the cost of an enlarged goal region. Trajectories from the displaced green and red waypoints with slightly different curvatures remain within the annulus.
We arrive at an invariant Ann saying we stay within this annular section, its conjuncts saying that the width ε does not exceed the curve radius defined by the curvature k, and that the waypoint (x, y) falls in the annulus.
Yet this does not suffice for our safety proof, as we also wish to ensure speed limits are obeyed. Trivial simplifying assumptions on the speed limits say they are distinct 0 ≤ vl < vh and large enough to not be crossed within a single control cycle (AT ≤ vh − vl and BT ≤ vh − vl). We use the following helper predicate Lim(v 1 , v 2 , a, x, y, k) for any velocities v 1 , v 2 and acceleration a, which intuitively says the difference v 1 −v 2 is small enough that it could be closed by an acceleration a before the waypoint (x, y) reaches the origin:
Here, δ Lim (v 1 , v 2 , a) is a bound on the distance needed to change velocity from v 1 to v 2 with an additional scaling factor (1 + |k|ε) 2 corresponding to the tolerance incurred from the width of the annular section compared to a straight line or arc. This tolerance is not too conservative in practice: it is tightest for small ε or small k (ε = 0 is a perfect arc, k = 0 is a straight line) and never exceeds 4. This suffices to define the loop invariant J, which says the upper and lower speed limits can be achieved using the robot's maximum braking (B) and acceleration (A):
Having identified a loop invariant candidate J we proceed to design a controller model ctrl that provably guarantees Theorem 1, waypoint-following safety. The main insight into the safety requirements for the controller design is provided by the dL loop invariant rule. Per standard proof rule notation, the formula on the bottom (conclusion) is valid any time all formulas on top (premisses) are valid:
The first two premisses say the invariant J holds initially and the postcondition follows from the invariant J, and so check that staying inside invariant J guarantees safety. These two premisses are proved automatically in KeYmaera X. The main task is finding control choices that make the third premiss provable: that the loop body α ≡ ctrl; plant preserves the invariant J. The heart of ctrl are the conditions Feas and Go; standard (automatic) dL proof steps tell us J must hold again after running the plant for time T :
Now we need only find Feas and Go which imply that conditions Ann, Lim(vh, v, B, x, y), and Lim(vl, v, A, x, y) will continue to hold throughout the evolution of plant.
The formula Ann and speed limits are differential invariants [19] of the plant, so it suffices to check that they hold initially in Feas. We also add the requirement that the waypoint starts in front of the robot (y > 0):
Condition Go, in contrast, must generalize the conditions prescribed by Lim. It does this by predicting future motion of the robot. We illustrate this with the upper bound conditions. Given that a must fall in the range [−B, A], we determine how to satisfy Lim(vh, v, B, x, y) after T time elapses. This occurs either when the chosen acceleration a already maintains speed limit bounds (v ≤ vh ∧ v+aT ≤ vh) or when there is enough distance left to restore the limits before reaching the goal. For straight line motion (k = 0), the distance can simply be found by integrating acceleration and speed:
vT
Similar to Lim, however, an additional scaling factor accounts for the tolerance incurred when traveling along the annulus. Conditions for the lower bound of the speed limit are found in a similar manner, which yields the following crucial condition Go for ctrl a :
This completes the proof of safety for the robot and shows that the requirements Feas we impose on the high-level planner together with the acceleration condition Go guarantee that the robot is within speed limit at the goal. We describe the liveness proof next. Crucially, the loop invariant J, which we have identified in this section is reused in the liveness proof.
B. Proving Liveness
We now show that the admissibility condition Go not only ensures safety, but also allows the robot to reach the goal within the imposed speed limits [vl, vh] by correctly chosing the acceleration a. The liveness proof starts with the loop rule with invariant J as in Theorem 1, after which we need to show:
As in the safety proof, the liveness proof reveals invariants that hold throughout the pursuit of the waypoint, but it also reveals a progress function whose value decreases as the robot moves toward the waypoint [22] . In practice, there are many strategies to arrive at the goal within speed limit; for proof simplicity, we choose a strategy that first enforces the speed limit v ∈ [vl, vh] with appropriate acceleration choices and then maintains that speed until it reaches the waypoint. This strategy splits the proof into the following two questions:
To prove Eq. 2, we pick the acceleration for ctrl a in each of three situations: i) if the robot is too slow (v < vl), it should speed up (pick a = A), ii) if the speed is in the limits (v ∈ [vl, vh]) it maintains speed (pick a = 0), or iii) if it is too fast (v > vh), it slows down (pick a = −B). In all three cases, the invariant v > 0 ∧ Ann are preserved throughout plant, which is why we may assume them in the subsequent proof of Eq. 3. The progress functions are more case specific: e.g., if the robot is initially too slow, the progress function g ≡ vl−v, which measures the gap to the speed limit, decreases as the robot speeds up.
Once the speed limit is achieved, the robot progresses toward the waypoint (Eq. 3) at a constant velocity (a = 0). We rely crucially on the progress function g = x 2 +y 2 −ε 2 , i.e., the (squared) Euclidean distance to the goal region. The intuition for this progress function is shown in Fig. 4 . The value of g is positive outside the goal region, strictly decreases along the trajectory, and is negative when the goal region is reached. These are the crucial ingredients in the proof of liveness, which we have formally checked in KeYmaera X.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION: SIMULATION AND ROBOT
In this section, we fulfill the goal of extending verification to the implementation level. We built a realistic implementation in the simulator AirSim. We then apply the VeriPhy synthesis tool to our verified dL model, producing a sandboxed controller which monitors the decisions made by the simulator. When those decisions match the model, they are guaranteed safe by Theorem 1, otherwise, the sandbox executes a simple fallback action (braking) which we have also proven safe in dL. Due to VeriPhy's use of verified compiler technology, the sandbox controller (including fallback) is guaranteed safe down to the machine code implementation, regardless what decisions are made by the simulator's controller, so long as the sensor values from the simulation match the assumptions of the plant model. The sandbox also contains a plant monitor which we use to measure whether these assumptions hold, and thus whether full safety is guaranteed in practice. This monitor also allows us to employ safe braking when plant assumptions are violated, in order to improve safety, albeit without the formal guarantee available in the other cases.
a) High-Level Planning: The planner uses the same motion primitives as the dL model: lines and arcs. This provides a flexible interface: the current planner uses static environments, but dynamic environments can be added without changing our model or proofs. Even with static graphs, we can for example represent a "go to point" mission as a graph with a common sink node, or a "patrol forever" mission as a strongly connected graph. We represent the environment as a finite, directed, possibly-cyclic graph. Fig. 5a shows a toy mission where the planner is free to pick between two paths at each of point B and point F. Each edge is labeled with, e.g., desired curvature and speed limit. Compared to the example of Fig. 5a , the environments we built for evaluation ( Fig. 5c-Fig. 5e ) are run with deterministic plans in order to provide the most meaningful evaluation results, but their plans are larger (≈80 segments on the largest environment).
b) Low-level Control: The high-level planner decides an ideal path to follow; the job of the low-level controller is to follow it within some tolerance. We give two classical feedback controllers: the bang-bang controller switches between hard-left and hard-right steering, while the PD scales to the discrepancy between current position and orientation vs. their target values. We compare the low-level controllers in AirSim, using a human operating AirSim as a baseline. c) AirSim Simulation: We chose AirSim's autonomous driving simulation, built on Unreal Engine, because it comes pre-configured with reasonable physics, which we trust more than an ad-hoc simulation. AirSim models key features such as suspensions and individual tires. We implemented our own planners and controllers in AirSim, ≈1100 lines of C++. We built the test environments in Unreal Editor and will publish them online should this paper be accepted. Fig. 5b shows the AirSim car driving in our rectangular environment. d) Results: We are interested in the liveness, monitor compliance, and safety of each controller in simulation. Strong results include reaching the objective quickly, complying with the monitors (especially the safety-critical plant monitor) a large majority of the time, and having no safety violations. Our three AirSim environments are shown in Fig. 5 . We built these environments to cover a well-rounded combination of navigating wider turns at medium speed (Fig. 5c ), navigating tight turns at lower speed (Fig. 5d ), and driving very gentle curves at high speed (Fig. 5e ). For each environment we ran patrol missions in the simulator with several bang-bang and PD controllers, configured to different speeds (Table II) . As a baseline, we also compare against the performance of amateur pilots (the authors) in AirSim. All implementations completed all environments without safety violations, as the safety proof promised. Overall, our diverse environments demonstrated monitor failure rates low enough that the car could navigate each to completion without stopping. This attests that our model is simultaneously robust to real-world inaccuracies and flexible enough for serious use.
All tests used a margin of ε = 3m, which was small enough to ensure safety on all our environments while maintaining good monitor failure rates. The slower PD controller (PD1, in bold) had the best (lowest) overall error rate. The human and the remaining controllers had high plant failure rate on the "Clover" level because long curves are difficult to track exactly without a large ε. PD control (particularly PD3) had speed and monitor failure rates competitive with the human baseline. The bang-bang controller had relatively high plant failure numbers on all environments because of its rough steering.
The takeaway from these results is that while complete model compliance is a real challenge, well-tuned controllers come close in a variety of environments. Notably, they do so even though our model is quite simple, the crucial insights being that the model must allow for realistic imperfections in sensing and actuation, and that the untrusted controller must mind both the model and real physics, for example by steering smoothly and placing limits on velocity. The large majority of the time, formal guarantees apply because the monitors hold. The plant monitor detects the few cases where guarantees do not apply, which helps us or any other developer identify and reduce the remaining noncompliant cases.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS
We developed an end-to-end verified ground robot in simulation. The heart of our architecture is our waypoint-following robot model in dL, which we have proved safe and live, and from which we synthesized a verified sandbox controller with VeriPhy. This sandbox enforces safety in AirSim by enforcing model assumptions with a verified-safe fallback action, with a formal safety guarantee so long as the plant assumptions hold.
The sandbox also automates assessing those physical assumptions, and our evaluation showed that they are indeed met in practice, owing to our model's flexibility. An important lesson from this work is that achieving a realistic model suitable for runtime monitoring does not always mean using a more complicated differential equation in the plant, but can often be done by introducing uncertainty into the model and invariants while keeping the plant simple enough to verify. After verifying a simple, flexible model, the resulting monitors are used to guide development of a safe controller.
Of course, nothing comes for free. The more uncertainty we introduce into the model, the more conservative it becomes. Within this framework, the exact margins of uncertainty are an engineering trade-off, and more detailed dynamical models might help reduce conservativity while maintaining safety.
The high-level proofs given herein also belie the complexity of the full formal KeYmaera X proofs as given in the supplement. As in prior works, a number of manual proof steps elided here are require before automation can finish the proofs. This confirms the importance of developing further automation for KeYmaera X in the future, but also highlights a strength of verification via sandboxing: now that a verified sandbox has been built, any developer can use it develop new verified ground robots, without needing to modify our KeYmaera X proofs.
In all, we have demonstrated end-to-end verification of a realistic ground robot for the first time, featuring free driving in 2D as implemented in a realistic simulation. Verifying other such systems remains non-trivial, yet we have demonstrated that dL proofs and VeriPhy sandboxes can serve as a robust tool in these efforts. 
